PHIL 2505
Contentualness & Formalism (Spring 2026)
Instructor: Doug Blue
Email: doug.blue[at]pitt.edu
Meetings: Tuesdays 10am-12:30pm in CL 1008B
Zoom link: Email me
Description
David Hilbert once described “the question of relations between
contentualness (Inhaltlichkeit) and formalism in mathematics
and logic” as among the most difficult epistemological problems with
scientific significance. This seminar will take up that question
directly.
Our central text will be Juliette Kennedy’s Gödel, Tarski and the
Lure of Natural Language: Logical Entanglement, Formalism Freeness,
through which we will explore the epistemological advantages of
formalization in mathematics and the phenomenon of “formalism freeness.”
Along the way, we will consider questions such as:
How does formalization contribute to knowledge acquisition?
What is the meaning of mathematical language?
What counts as a natural formal theory?
To what extent are formal systems adequate models of mathematical
practice?
We will reflect on the broader implications of these issues for the
philosophy of mathematical practice, traditional philosophy of
mathematics, and linguistic philosophy, both ideal and ordinary.
Course structure
The course will consist of four units.
Rigor
The relation of mathematical logic to mathematics
Intension and interpretation
Formalism freeness
Requirements
Auditors and participants taking the course for credit may be asked
to present material.
Participants taking the course for credit are expected to write a
term paper.
1/13 Introduction
Background reading:
Burgess, Rigor and Structure, chapters 1 & 2
Avigad, Mathematics and the formal turn
1/20 Proof
Reading:
Rav, Why do we prove theorems?
Azzouni, Why do informal proofs conform to formal norms?
Azzouni, The derivation-indicator view of mathematical
practice.
Rav, A critique of a formalist-mechanist version of the
justification of arguments in mathematicians’ proof practices.
1/27 Proof
Reading:
Tanswell, A problem with the dependence of informal proofs on formal
proofs.
Azzouni, The algorithmic-device view of informal rigorous
mathematical proof.
2/3 Virtues of informal proof
Reading:
Dawson, Why do mathematicians reprove theorems?
Hersh, Some proposals for reviving the philosophy of
mathematics.